

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----281406Z 008787 /50

R 281100Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2470
ALL NATO CAPITALS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 1742

EXDIS

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REF: SECTO 3017

FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT ACTION MOSCOW MARC 26, 1977 REPEATED
FOR YOUR ACTION:

QUOTE S E C R E T USNATO 1742

EXDIS

MOSCOW FOR S/S

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS R.), PFOR, NATO
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S BRIEFING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, MARCH 26

1. THERE FOLLOWS FOR APPROVAL AND RETRANSMITTAL OUR DRAFT
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S MARCH 26 BRIEFING OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC COUNCIL.

BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT REPORT:

SUMMARY: IN THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH THE NORTH
SECRET

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ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON MARCH 26 TO BRIEF THE ALLIES ON THE
PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW, ALLIED
REPRESENTATIVES EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE
SECRETARY'S COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT. WELCOMING ALSO
THE SENSITIVITY TO ALLIED CONCERNS REFLECTED IN THE
SECRETARY'S REMARKS, PERMREPS ASKED QUESTIONS RELATING
PRIMARILY TO SALT, OTHER ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS,
THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER INTRODUCING THE SECRETARY TO MEMBERS OF THE

COUNCIL, LUNS OPENED THE MEETING BY WELCOMING THE SECRETARY, AND EXPRESSING THE GRATITUDE OF THE ALLIES FOR THE SECRETARY'S BRIEFING BEFORE HIS MISSION TO THE USSR AND FOR THE PROMISED DEBRIEFING BY US OFFICIALS FOLLOWING THE MOSCOW VISIT.

2. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR HIM TO MEET WITH THE COUNCIL AND THAT HE WOULD DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF HIS TRIP TO MOSCOW AND PROVIDE SOME DETAIL ON THE SUBJECTS HE INTENDED TO TAKE UP WITH THE SOVIETS. THE SECRETARY THEN PRESENTED HIS PREPARED STATEMENT (TO BE PROVIDED SEPTEL).

3. LUNS THANKED THE SECRETARY FOR HIS STATEMENT TO WHICH, HE WAS SURE, ALL HAD LISTENED WITH GREAT INTEREST. HE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SECRETARY TO PROVIDE COPIES OF HIS STATEMENT TO THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD DO SO PROVIDED FULL PRECAUTIONS WERE TAKEN, BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT THE SOVIETS TO LEARN ABOUT THE US POSITION FROM THE PRESS BEFORE HE HAD PRESENTED IT TO THE SOVIETS. LUNS STRESSED THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AND SAID COPIES WOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY TO THE NATO AMBASSADORS.

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4. CATALANO (ITALY, THE DEAN OF THE COUNCIL) EXPRESSED HIS DEEP GRATITUDE FOR THE SECRETARY'S DETAILED PRESENTATION, WHICH HE SAW AS ONE OF MANY STEPS, INCLUDING THE VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIAL, THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION HAD TAKEN TO AFFIRM US INTEREST IN NATO. ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WERE GRATIFIED BY THE NEW ADMINISTRATION'S ACTIVITIES IN THIS REGARD, WHICH CATALANO HOPED WOULD SPUR THE ALLIES TO RESPOND WITH INDICATIONS OF THEIR OWN INTEREST AND COMMITMENT TO ALLIED PURPOSES. NOTING THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS ON MBFR, CATALANO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE US INTENTION TO ATTEMPT TO PRESS FOR GREATER POLITICAL ATTENTION TO THE NEGOTIATION WITHOUT TOUCHING ON THOSE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE ALLIED POSITIN THAT WERE OF DEEP IMPORTANCE TO THE EUROPEANS AND THAT HAD BEENDEVELOPED AND APPROVED THROUGH CONSULTATIONS. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, CATALANO RECALLED THAT DURING HIS FOREIGN MINISTER'S RECENT VISIT TO THE AREA, SADAT AND ASSAD HAD EMPHASIZED THAT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT WERE NOW AT A CRUCIAL STAGE AND THAT THE US AND THE USSR HAD A SPECIAL ROLE TO PLAY WITH RESPECT TO ISRAEL AND THE ARABS. CATALANO THEREFORE ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO THIS ASPECT OF US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS AND SAID HE

WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO THE DEBRIEFING FOLLOWING THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECDEF.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----281425Z 009041 /41

R 281100Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2471
ALL NATO CAPITALS

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EXDIS

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5. KILLICK (UK) CONGRATULATED THE SECRETARY ON HIS
APPOINTMENT AND WISHED HIM EVERY SUCCESS ON HIS TRIP.
IT WAS A GREAT PERSONAL PLEASURE FOR HIM TO SEE THE
SECRETARY AGAIN AND HE RECALLED THEIR HAPPY ASSOCIATION
AT VARIOUS CONFERENCES SUCH AS DITCHLEY. ALL THE ALLIES
RECOGNIZED THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, AND
ALTHOUGH THEY SOMETIMES EVIDENCED RESENTMENT ABOUT THE ROLE
OF THE SUPERPOWERS, KILLICK HAD EXPERIENCE WITH BOTH
SUPERPOWERS AND KNEW VERY WELL WHICH SIDE HE WAS ON. FROM THE
SECRETARY'S DETAILED BRIEFING, KILLICK GATHERED THAT
THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW WOULD BE FOR RECONAIS-
SANCE PURPOSES AND FOR THE PURSUIT OF REALISTIC AIMS.
IT WAS IRONIC, HE THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL RECENTLY
FELT IT DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH ON ITS AGENDA, SINCE
THE PROGRAM OUTLINED BY THE SECRETARY OFFERED--IF THE SOVIETS
RESPONDED POSITIVELY-- THE PROSPECT OF A GREAT DEAL OF HARD
WORK FOR THE ALLIES IN CONSULTATIONS.

6. KILLICK SUPPORTED THE SECRETARY'S VIEW THAT THE
US SHOULD APPROACH EACH FACET OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS
ON ITS MERITS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, WERE GREAT
PEOPLE FOR LINKAGE AND MIGHT THEMSELVES VIEW SOME
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ASPECTS OF THE US APPROACH AS BEING INTERRELATED. IN
THIS REGARD, KILLICK HOPED THE US WOULD MAKE CLEAR TO
THE SOVIETS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WESTERN POSITION ON
BERLIN AND THE SIGNIFICANCE THE WEST ATTACHED TO

FULL OBSERVATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT. BERLIN REMAINED AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD TREAD ON WESTERN TOES, AND THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE REMINDED OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANY UNTOWARD ACTIONS IN THIS AREA. KILLICK BELIEVED IT SHOULD ALSO BE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT LINKAGE WAS IMPLICIT IN WESTERN MINDS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF DETENTE SINCE THE SOVIETS MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THEY CANNOT HAVE DETENTE IF THEY CONTINUE TO GO AHEAD WITH THE TREMENDOUS ARMS BUILDUP THAT WAS OF CONCERN TO THE ALLIES. INDEED, KILLICK BELIEVED THIS VIEW AS IMPLICIT IN THE EMPHASIS THAT THE US WAS PLACING ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES IN TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS.

7. EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S DESCRIPTION OF THE US APPROACH ON SALT, KILLICK SAID IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO AGREE QUICKLY TO THE COMPREHENSIVE US PACKAGE, AND ALSO DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO AGREE TO THE SECOND PACKAGE BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAVE OUT CRUISE MISSILES WHICH THE SOVIETS WANTED TO LIMIT. HE THEREFORE BELIEVED IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO REACH INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD PERMIT THE EXTENSION OF SALT I WHILE A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT WAS WORKED OUT. KILLICK WAS GLAD TO NOTE THAT ALLIED INTERESTS WITH RESPECT TO CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AT THE SAME TIME, IT HAD BECOME CLEAR DURING THE COUNCIL DISCUSSION WITH MR. GELB THAT THE ALLIES WERE NOT CLEAR ON WHAT THEIR INTERESTS WERE REGARDING CRUISE MISSILES, AND THERE WAS A NEED, THEREFORE, FOR URGENT ALLIED CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER.

8. RECALLING THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, KILLICK ASKED WHETHER THE ARRANGEMENTS THE PRESIDENT

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DENT FORESAW REGARDING THE LEGAL FRONTIERS FOR ISRAEL WOULD BE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS PENDING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SOME OCCUPIED AREAS OR WHETHER THESE FRONTIERS WERE TO BE PERMANENT. NOTING THAT THE US INTENTION TO PROBE THE SOVIETS ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL DEFENSE EFFORTS WAS THE FIRST INDICATION THE ALLIES HAD OF US INTEREST IN SUCH RESTRAINTS, KILLICK ASKED WHETHER US INTEREST WAS PROMPTED BY CONCERN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SEEKING A PREEMPTIVE FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY.

9. IN RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WERE ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP THAT CAPABILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, A GREAT DEAL HAD BEEN WRITTEN ON THIS SUBJECT AND ON SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE EFFORTS, AND CONCERNS HAD BEEN RAISED IN THE MIND OF THE PUBLIC. IT THEREFORE SEEMED APPROPRIATE TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE SOVIETS AND TO INDICATE THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO LIVE WITH LIMITA-

TIONS ON CIVIL DEFENSE EFFORTS IF THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO BE

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----281438Z 009172 /41

R 281100Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2472
ALL NATO CAPITALS

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EXDIS

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PREPARED TO DO SO. IN THIS WAY SOVIET ATTITUDES ON THIS
SUBJECT COULD BE FURTHER CLARIFIED. THE SECRETARY SAID HE SAW
THE SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM AS DESIGNED TO TAKE
CARE OF CERTAIN NECESSITIES THAT EXIST, AND IF THE
SOVIETS CAN MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY ALSO SEE THEIR PROGRAM
IN THIS WAY, THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WOULD HELP TO
MEET PUBLIC CONCERNS IN THIS AREA. AS TO THE MIDDLE
EAST, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT
HAD STRESSED THAT ANY SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO BE ONE
WORKED OUT BY THE PARTIES. REGARDING KILLICK'S SPECIFIC
QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS
REFERRING TO INTERIM RATHER THAN PERMANENT FRONTIERS.

10. PAULS (FRG) SAID THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION
PROVIDED FURTHER ASSURANCE THAT THE ALLIES WOULD
CONTINUE TO ENJOY THE GREATEST CONFIDENCE IN THE US
AND THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS WOULD BE TAKEN
INTO CONSIDERATION IN US DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS.
THIS WAS TRUE PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES
OF FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS, NON-TRANSFER, AND NON-
CIRCUMVENTION IN THE SALT TALKS. PAULS EXPRESSED
APPRECIATION FOR THE SECRETARY'S INTENTION TO TAKE UP
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BERLIN WITH THE SOVIETS, SUPPORTED THE COMMENTS OF
KILLICK ON THIS ISSUE, AND SAID THAT A FIRM
EXPRESSION OF US VIEWS WOULD NOT FAIL TO IMPRESS THE
SOVIETS. WITH REGARD TO AFRICA, PAULS SAID THE US AIM
APPEARED TO BE TO GET THE SOVIETS TO AGREE TO

END OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. HE ASKED WHETHER THE US EXPECTED TO BE ABLE TO ESTABLISH SPECIFIC STANDARDS WITH THE SOVIETS IN THIS AREA.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID IT WAS STILL TOO EARLY TO EXPECT A SPECIFIC PROGRAM TO BE WORKED OUT WITH THE SOVIETS IN THIS REGARD. THE EFFORT WOULD BE RATHER TO ESTABLISH PRINCIPLES THAT WOULD LEAVE IT TO THE AFRICANS TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN PROBLEMS AND SETTLE THEIR OWN FUTURE.

12. BUSCH (NORWAY) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES VIEW SALT AS A CRUCIAL LINK IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA WILL HAVE A DECISIVE INFLUENCE ON OTHER KEY ISSUES SUCH AS MBFR. IN ADDITION, NORWAY IS GIVING INCREASED ATTENTION TO A CTB AND TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS. NORWAY BELIEVES PNE SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED IN A CTB. BUSCH ASKED FOR ANY INDICATIONS SECRETARY VANCE MIGHT HAVE REGARDING SOVIET ATTITUDES ON PNE AND ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS.

13. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THAT, IN THE CONTEXT OF A PNE AGREEMENT, THEY WOULD WISH EXCEPTIONS MADE FOR A SIBERIAN RIVER PROJECT AND FOR A MINING PROJECT IN THE WESTERN USSR. THE US, ON THE OTHER HAND, BELIEVES THAT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS WOULD BE SO COMPLEX THAT ALLOWING SUCH EXCEPTIONS WOULD BE A MISTAKE. AS REGARDS CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THEY ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE AS A MATTER OF GENERAL PRINCIPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE ALSO STATED THAT SUCH
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LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL PRIOR TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT.

14. SVART (DENMARK) SAID HE WAS SURE THAT THE KREMLIN WILL HAVE DULY NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY STOPPED TO CONSULT WITH THE ALLIES PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW. EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE DEPTH AND BREADTH OF THE SECRETARY'S PRESENTATION, THE DANISH PERMREP GAVE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO THE ARMS CONTROL ISSUES THAT HAD BEEN RAISED AND COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SHOW THE WORLD THAT THE WEST HAS A POSITIVE APPROACH. REFERRING TO THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT LINKAGE, SVART SAID THAT LINKAGE WAS A PRACTICE THAT WAS DIFFICULT FOR TOTALITARIAN STATES TO AVOID. HE ASKED THE SECRETARY FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION HE EXPECTED TO FIND IN MOSCOW.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECDEF.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----281441Z 009273 /50

R 281100Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2473
ALL NATO CAPITALS

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EXDIS

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15. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE ANTICIPATED HARD BARGAINING. WHILE THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY REJECT THE PRINCIPLE OF LINKAGE, THEY NEVERTHELESS SAY THAT CERTAIN FACTS AFFECT SPECIFIC ISSUES. THE INITIAL ATMOSPHERE AT MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY BE CHILLY, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS DESIRE PROGRESS ON SALT AND THAT THERE WILL BE SERIOUS TALKS ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES.

16 HARDY (CANADA) SAID HE WAS GRAIFIED BY THE "CLOSE AND MEANINGFUL" CONSULTATIONS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE PRESENTATIONS OF SECRETARY VANCE TODAY ANDMR. GELB ON MARCH 21. HARDY ADDED THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE VISIT TO NATO BY MESSRS. HARTMAN AND GELB AFTER THE MOSCOW TALKS AND WOULD BE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED AT THAT TIME IN HEARING ABOUT SOVIET VIEWS ON:

A) LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND HUMAN RIGHTS, B) THE BELGRADE CSCE MEETINGS, AND C) HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO JEWISH EMIGRATION.

17. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) ASKED FOR AN ELABORATION
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OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S VIEWS ON RELATIONS WITH CUBA IN THE BROADER EAST-WEST CONTEXT. THE SECRETARY SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH CUBA, SUCH AS FISHING RIGHTS, TRAVEL, THE CUBAN ATTITUDE TOWARD PUERTO RICO, CUBA'S ROLE IN AFRICA, CLAIMS FOR EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY, AND DIVIDED FAMILY ISSUES. FOR THEIR PART, THE CUBANS ARE SEEKING A LIFTING OF THE TRADE EMBARGO. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS DECIDED IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SEE IF PROGRESS CAN BE MADE IN A MEASURED

WAY WITH CUBA RATHER THAN TO LET PRESENT PROBLEMS FESTER. THE ESTABLISHMENT BY THE US OF A FISHING ZONE HAD MADE IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE TWO SIDES BEGIN WITH THIS ISSUE, BUT THE US HOPES THAT PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON OTHER MATTERS AS WELL. IT WILL BE A LONG PROCESS, BUT ONE WHICH WAS LONG OVERDUE.

18. TINE (FRANCE) SAID THAT, WITH REGARD TO A CTB, THE FRENCH POSITION ON THIS QUESTION WAS WELL KNOWN. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FRENCH DETERRENT FORCE PRESUPPOSES THE CONTINUATION OF TESTING. HE RECALLED THAT THE US AND USSR HAD HELD MORE NUMEROUS AND MORE POWERFUL TESTS THAN FRANCE, AND FRANCE INTENDS TO KEEP COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION. TINE UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND SOVIET UNION COULD ONLY APPLY TO THE PARTIES TO SUCH AN AGREEMENT, BUT NOTED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD INDICATED THE HOPE THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT MIGHT IN TIME EXTEND TO ALL STATES.

19. TURNING TO THE INDIAN OCEAN, TINE SAID FRANCE HAS A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THIS REGION, WHICH CONTAINS THE FRENCH DEPARTMENT OF REUNION AND OTHER TERRITORIES, AND MAINTAINS A MODEST NAVAL PRESENCE THERE. TINE ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD INDIAN OCEAN LIMITATIONS AND PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR AN INDIAN OCEAN ZONE OF PEACE.

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20. THE SECRETARY RECOGNIZED THAT OTHER NATIONS HAVE AN INTEREST IN POSSIBLE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN. AT MOSCOW, HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO FIND OUT SPECIFICALLY WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND SO TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE IS A POSSIBILITY FOR NEGOTIATIONS. MOREOVER, THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONSULT WITH INTERESTED STATES BEFORE ENTERING INTO SUCH NEGOTIATIONS.

21. HILL-NORTON (CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE) ASKED THE FOLLOWING THREE QUESTIONS:

--HOW DOES ONE POLICE AN AGREEMENT COVERING NON-IMPROVEMENT IN QUALITY OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS?

--HOW CAN PROGRESS BE MADE ON MBFR IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT IMPASSES ON COUNTING RULES?

--WHAT WOULD MOSCOW ASK IN EXCHANGE FOR A SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM THE INDIAN OCEAN?

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO SECDEF.

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----281413Z 008896 /50

R 281100Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2474
ALL NATO CAPITALS

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22. IN REPLY TO HILL-NORTON'S FIRST QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID THE US BELIEVES THERE IS A NEED FOR ADEQUATE VERIFICATION (E.G., ON-SITE INSPECTIONS). AS REGARDS MBFR, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT SOVIET RESPONSES TO WESTERN QUESTIONS ON COUNTING RULES HAD BEEN INADEQUATE AND HE PLANNED TO RAISE THIS MATTER IN MOSCOW. ON THE INDIAN OCEAN THE SECRETARY SAID THAT VARIOUS TYPES OF DEMILITARIZATION ARE POSSIBLE. SUCH AS REMOVAL OF BASES OR LIMITATION OF SHIP VISITS. IF THE US DETERMINES THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SERIOUS PROPOSALS TO MAKE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THEM IN AN APPROPRIATE FORUM.

22. FISCHBACK (LUXEMBOURG) NOTED THAT TWO DAYS AGO, AFTER BREZHNEV'S TRIADE AGAINST THE US INTEREST IN HUMAN RIGHTS, PRESIDENT CARTER TRIED TO DEFUSE THE BOMB. BUT THE PRESIDENT MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE MOSCOW TALKS MAY NOT BE A SUCCESS, AND THAT IF THEY ARE A FAILURE, US POLICY WOULD HAVE TO BE REVISED. FISCHBACH ASKED AT WHAT POINT REVISION WOULD BE IN ORDER. THE SECRETARY SAID OUR ASSESSMENT WOULD DEPEND ON THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS DEAL WITH OUR PROPOSALS AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF
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THE PROPOSALS THEY PUT FORTH. IT WAS TOO EARLY TO SET DOWN A YARDSTICK FOR JUDGING SOVIET RESPONSE AND, THE SECRETARY SAID, HE WOULD NOT BE SO RASH AS TO DO SO TODAY.

23. RECALLING THE SECRETARY'S RESPONSE TO KILLICK ON SOVIET PREEMPTIVE STRIKE CAPABILITY, LUNS ASSUMED THE SECRETARY WAS SPEAKING OF SOVIET INTENTIONS RATHER THAN CAPABILITIES, AND NOTED THE RELEVANCE OF FRENCH AND UK CAPABILITIES TO SOVIET CALCULATIONS.

24. LUNS OBSERVED THAT DURING THE EXCELLENT BRIEFING THE US RECENTLY GAVE AT NATO. IN WASHINGTON, AND IN ALLIED CAPITALS ON SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES, THE ALLIES WERE STRUCK BY SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS. LUNS SAID THE SECRETARY SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THE US AND THE USSR WERE AT ROUGHLY THE SAME LEVEL IN THIS REGARD, AND ASKED WHETHER THE SECRETARY WAS NOT TOO OPTIMISTIC. LUNS THEN ASKED THE SECRETARY IF HE INTENDED TO RAISE WITH THE SOVIETS THE QUESTION OF THE SS-20 AND THE SOVIET ROLE IN A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT IN LIGHT OF BREZHNEV'S RECENT STATEMENT. LUNS ALSO INQUIRED WHETHER THE US WOULD ALLOW CUBA TO CONTINUE ITS MILITARY ACTIVITY IN AFRICA WHILE THE US PROCEEDED WITH TALKS WITH CUBA.

25. ON THE QUESTION OF FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT EACH COUNTRY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS OBVIOUSLY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO LAUNCH A FIRST STRIKE. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT RATIONAL LEADERS WOULD DO SO IF THEY TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE RESPONSE WHICH WOULD COME WITH A SECOND STRIKE. LUNS INTERJECTED THAT THIS RESPONSE COULD BE EXPECTED IN EIGHT MINUTES. THE SECRETARY THEN COMMENTED THAT IN A SENSE HE WAS TALKING ABOUT INTENTIONS--BUT INTENTIONS HAD TO BE JUDGED ALONG WITH THE FACTORS AFFECTING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERCEPTION. SECRET

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TIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

27 WITH REGARD TO CIVIL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BETTER PREPARED THAN THE US BUT THERE IS NOT SO MUCH IMBALANCE AS SOME RECENT STUDIES WOULD SUGGEST.

28. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE SS-20 IN MOSCOW BUT NOT AS A PART OF SALT DISCUSSIONS SINCE THE SOVIETS COULD USE IT TO RAISE THE FBS ISSUE.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO SECDEF.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----281504Z 009382 /50
R 281100Z MAR 77
FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2475
ALL NATO CAPITALS

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29. REGARDING LUNS' QUESTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE SAW LITTLE NEW IN BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MIDDLE EAST IN MOSCOW, BUT THE BREZHNEV STATEMENT ITSELF DID NOT SEEM TO BREAK NEW GROUND.

30. THE SECRETARY THEN RETURNED TO HILL-NORTON'S QUESTION ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, NOTING THAT A LIMIT ON MISSILE TEST FLIGHTS IS ANOTHER WAY TO APPROACH THE PROBLEM: LIMITS OF "X" ON LAND-BASED FLIGHTS AND "Y" ON SEA -BASED FLIGHTS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED.

31. REGARDING CUBA, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT THE QUESTION WAS TOO MUCH IN THE FUTURE TO RESPOND AT THIS POINT.

32. LUNS CLOSED THE SESSION BY NOTING THAT THIS WAS THE LAST TIME AMBASSADOR STRAUZ-HUPE WOULD BE ATTENDING A MEETING OF THIS KIND. HE TOLD THE SECRETARY HE WANTED TO POINT OUT WHAT EMINENT SERVICE THE AMBASSADOR HAD RENDERED BOTH TO THE US AND THE ALLIANCE. HE WOULD
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BE SORELY MISSED. HIS SUCCESSOR WOULD HAVE A HARD TIME EMULATING HIM, AND HE HAD GAINED THE DEEP RESPECT OF THE COUNCIL. IN RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO ADD HIS PERSONAL THANKS FOR THE DISTINGUISHED WORK THE AMBASSADOR HAD DONE; HE HAS THE HEARTFELT THANKS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

33. LUNS STATED, IN CONCLUSION, THAT WHAT THE SECRETARY HAD SAID AT THE COUNCIL WOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS COSMIC TOP SECRET, NOTING THAT THE SECRETARY HAS THE RIGHT TO HAVE HIS WORDS PROTECTED AGAINST LEAKS.
STRAUSZ-HUPE UNQUOTE STRAUZ-HUPE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED TO SECDEF.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 30-Aug-1999 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 28-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977NATO01742
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: n/a
Format: TEL
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197703110/baaabcos.tel
Line Count: 593
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Message ID: 309f01b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: SECTO 3017
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01-Jul-2008 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2963626
Secure: OPEN
Status: <DBA CHANGED> MCM 20040726
Subject: SECRETARY'S BRIEFING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, MARCH 26
TAGS: OVIP
To: STATE ALL NATO CAPITALS
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/309f01b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009